Assertoric Semantics and the Computational Power of Self-Referential Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):317-345 (2012)
Abstract
There is no consensus as to whether a Liar sentence is meaningful or not. Still, a widespread conviction with respect to Liar sentences (and other ungrounded sentences) is that, whether or not they are meaningful, they are useless . The philosophical contribution of this paper is to put this conviction into question. Using the framework of assertoric semantics , which is a semantic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth that has been developed by the author, we show that certain computational problems, called query structures , can be solved more efficiently by an agent who has self-referential resources (amongst which are Liar sentences) than by an agent who has only classical resources; we establish the computational power of self-referential truth . The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of the established result for deflationary accounts of truth
Keywords Liar paradox  self reference  assertoric semantics  self-referential truth  query structures  computational power  computation  inferential semantics  information retrieval
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9162-2
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
On the Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-20.

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