Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):317-345 (2012)

Authors
Stefan Wintein
Tilburg University
Abstract
There is no consensus as to whether a Liar sentence is meaningful or not. Still, a widespread conviction with respect to Liar sentences (and other ungrounded sentences) is that, whether or not they are meaningful, they are useless . The philosophical contribution of this paper is to put this conviction into question. Using the framework of assertoric semantics , which is a semantic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth that has been developed by the author, we show that certain computational problems, called query structures , can be solved more efficiently by an agent who has self-referential resources (amongst which are Liar sentences) than by an agent who has only classical resources; we establish the computational power of self-referential truth . The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of the established result for deflationary accounts of truth
Keywords Liar paradox  self reference  assertoric semantics  self-referential truth  query structures  computational power  computation  inferential semantics  information retrieval
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9162-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,447
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
First-Order Logic.Raymond M. Smullyan - 1968 - New York [Etc.]Springer-Verlag.
A Useful Four-Valued Logic.N. D. Belnap - 1977 - In J. M. Dunn & G. Epstein (eds.), Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic. D. Reidel.
Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On the Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-20.
Against Crude Semantic Realism.Florian Demont - 2009 - ILLC Technical Notes (X) Series.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 137--159.
Liar Paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
This is Nonsense.Gregor Damschen - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
Super Liars.Philippe Schlenker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):374-414.
Denying The Liar.Dale Jacquette - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-02-25

Total views
90 ( #102,286 of 2,330,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #151,477 of 2,330,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes