Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690 (2014)

Stefan Wintein
Erasmus University Rotterdam
In a recent paper, Philip Kremer proposes a formal and theory-relative desideratum for theories of truth that is spelled out in terms of the notion of ‘no vicious reference’. Kremer’s Modified Gupta-Belnap Desideratum (MGBD) reads as follows: if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. In this paper, we suggest an alternative desideratum (AD): if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that all T-biconditionals are (strongly) assertible in M. We illustrate that MGBD and AD are not equivalent by means of a Generalized Strong Kleene theory of truth and we argue that AD is preferable over MGBD as a desideratum for theories of truth
Keywords Desiderata for theories of truth  Self-reference  No vicious reference
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-013-9285-3
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
What Is Assertion.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
The Revision Theory of Truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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