The Capgras delusion: an integrated approach

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):183-205 (2016)
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Abstract

Delusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an analytic, cognitive neuropsychological two-factor account of the Capgras delusion and the phenomenological view of delusions might be integrated.

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