Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):183-205 (2016)
AbstractDelusions are studied in two philosophical traditions: the continental or phenomenological tradition and the Anglo-American or analytic tradition. Each has its own view of delusions. Broadly stated, phenomenologists view delusions as a disturbed experience whilst most analytic researchers view them as beliefs. It is my contention that the most plausible account of delusions must ultimately incorporate valuable insights from both traditions. To illustrate the potential value of integration I provide a novel model of the Capgras delusion which describes how an analytic, cognitive neuropsychological two-factor account of the Capgras delusion and the phenomenological view of delusions might be integrated.
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Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Madness And Modernism: Insanity In The Light Of Modern Art, Literature, And Thought.Louis Sass - 1992 - Oxford University Press USA.
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