Journal of Philosophy 114 (10):536-550 (2017)

Authors
Rachael Wiseman
University of Liverpool
Abstract
There is a deep connection between Anscombe’s argument that ‘I’ is not a referring expression and Intention’s account of practical knowledge and knowledge without observation. The assumption that the so-called “no-reference thesis” can be resisted while the account of action set out in her book INTENTION is embraced is based on a misunderstanding of the argument of “The First Person” and the status of its conclusion; removing that misunderstanding helps to illuminate the concept of practical knowledge and brings into view a novel account of the relation between self-consciousness, agency, and first-person thought.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Anscombe  Self-Consciousness
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil20171141037
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Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs.Rachael Wiseman - 2020 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87:85-99.
Re-Reading Anscombe on ‘I’.Robert J. Stainton - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):70-93.

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