Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200 (2003)

Abstract

In his 'The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the 'anti-essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
71 (#165,677)

6 months
1 (#386,031)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

D. Gene Witmer
University of Florida

Citations of this work

Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism.Stephanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How Essentialists Misunderstand Locke.Nigel Leary - 2009 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (3):273-292.
Knowing at Second Hand.Benjamin McMyler - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):511 – 540.
Evolutionary Essentialism.Denis Walsh - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):425-448.