Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200 (2003)
AbstractIn his 'The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the 'anti-essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis
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References found in this work
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.John Dupré - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - New York, NY, USA: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Blackwell.
Citations of this work
Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism.Stephanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.
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