Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):181-200 (2003)
Abstract
In his 'The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the 'anti-essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis
Keywords Essentialism  Ethics  Reductionism  Science  Dupre, J
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00305
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Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.

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Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.

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