Ed Witherspoon
Colgate University
Frege and Heidegger appear to appear to have diametrically opposed attitudes towards logic. Frege thinks logic must govern any investigation whatsoever, whereas Heidegger (in "What is Metaphysics?") apparently wants to dismantle logic. But when they try to explicate the nature of judgment, a striking similarity emerges. For while their accounts of judgment are radically different, each finds his account to be, by his own lights, _inexpressible<D>. This paper shows how Heidegger and Frege arrive at their respective accounts of judgment, explains why they regard the status of their accounts as problematic, and explores and evaluates their responses to their parallel predicaments
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2002.0021
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Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: A Dialetheic Interpretation of the Late Heidegger.Filippo Casati - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1002-1024.

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