Multiple realizability and psychological laws: Evaluating Kim's challenge

In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 59 (2003)


A close examination of Kim's argument in "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction" for the claim that if a kind is multiply realizable in a way that blocks identification with more fundamental properties it is also a kind unlikely to appear as an appropriate kind in a theory in the first place. Ultimately, I argue that there is one reasonably promising argument of this sort, but its success turns on explanatory questions the answers to which are far from obvious.

Download options


    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,805

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

32 (#361,321)

6 months
1 (#386,031)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

D. Gene Witmer
University of Florida

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Two Kinds of Role Property.Douglas Keaton - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):773-788.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.Ned Block - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.
Emergence Unscathed: Kim on Non-Reducible Types.Ron McClamrock - 1993 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3.