In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 59 (2003)
AbstractA close examination of Kim's argument in "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction" for the claim that if a kind is multiply realizable in a way that blocks identification with more fundamental properties it is also a kind unlikely to appear as an appropriate kind in a theory in the first place. Ultimately, I argue that there is one reasonably promising argument of this sort, but its success turns on explanatory questions the answers to which are far from obvious.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Similar books and articles
Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale.Sungsu Kim - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability.Holger Lyre - 2009 - In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Ontos. pp. 79.
Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (April):178-92.