Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief

Bulletin of the Section of Logic 51 (1):57-71 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper we analyse logic of false belief in the intuitionistic setting. This logic, studied in its classical version by Steinsvold, Fan, Gilbert and Venturi, describes the following situation: a formula $\varphi$ is not satisfied in a given world, but we still believe in it. Another interpretations are also possible: e.g. that we do not accept $\varphi$ but it is imposed on us by a kind of council or advisory board. From the mathematical point of view, the idea is expressed by an adequate form of modal operator $\mathsf{W}$ which is interpreted in relational frames with neighborhoods. We discuss monotonicity of forcing, soundness, completeness and several other issues. Finally, we mention the fact that it is possible to investigate intuitionistic logics of unknown truths.

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Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief.Christopher Steinsvold - 2011 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.
Advisory board.[author unknown] - 1971 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 14 (1-4):1-1.

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