Synthese 67 (2):369 - 379 (1986)
In this paper we respond to the article An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing by D. G. Mayo (1983). We argue that the theory of testing developed by Mayo, NPT*, is neither novel nor objective. We also respond to the claims made by Mayo against Bayesian theory.
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References found in this work BETA
In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals.Deborah G. Mayo - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):269-280.
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