Williamson on Evidence Neutrality


Abstract
This paper looks at Timothy Williamson’s formulation of the thesis of Evidence Neutrality (EN). I motivate and argue for an upgraded version of EN by showing that changing one’s assumption about the nature of evidence (i.e. fallibility vs. factivity) generates a different verdict on EN. Then, I show how Williamson’s interpretation of EN is incomplete in light of a principle that guides his complete understanding of the nature of evidence. I reformulate EN to overcome deficiencies in Williamson’s interpretation of EN, and, lastly, I use cases from philosophy and science to show that reformulated‐EN promotes better practices in both domains while, at the same time, it avoids psychologizing evidence.
Keywords Timothy Williamson  Evidence
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