Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (4):363-381 (2011)

Authors
Gabriel Wollner
Universität Bayreuth
Abstract
Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will have to succeed in jointly (a) offering a convincing account of the wrongness of coercion, (b) rendering cogent the idea that the demand of equality arises in response to the moral problem of coercion, and (c) identifying some types of interaction as relevantly coercive. This challenge, I believe, cannot be met. More precisely, I argue that two important accounts of coercion fail to meet it.
Keywords Justice  Equality  Coercion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2011.01539.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,823
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Global Justice.Thomas Nagel - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2):113-147.
Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.Michael Blake - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (3):257-296.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Systemic Domination as Ground of Justice.Jugov Tamara - 2020 - European Journal of Political Theory 19 (1).
The Third Wave of Theorizing Global Justice. A Review Essay.Gabriel Wollner - 2013 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 6:21-39.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-07

Total views
73 ( #140,062 of 2,425,991 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #349,733 of 2,425,991 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes