Samozwrotność i odrzucanie

Filozofia Nauki 1 (1993)
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Abstract

The paper consists of two parts. The first contains the paradox of Truth-teller, i.e. a sentence which asserts own truth. The paradox appears when we apply logic of rejection to the Truth-teller sentence. The Truth-teller paradox is symmetric with respect to the Liar paradox. The second part considers a sentence which asserts own provability. This sentence is unprovable on the base of rejection logic. This leads to counterparts of the Gödel incompleteness theorems and other metamathematical results

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Author Profiles

Jan Hertrich-Woleński
Jagiellonian University
Jan Wolenski
Jagiellonian University

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