Moore, the skeptic, and the philosophical context

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):271–287 (2006)
Authors
Wai-hung Wong
California State University, Chico
Abstract
I argue that Moore's arguments have anti-skeptical force even though they beg the question against skepticism because they target the skeptic rather than skepticism directly. Moore offers two arguments which are usually conflated by his interpreters, namely, his proof of an external world and a reductio argument. I explain why the anti-skeptical force of the latter has to be derived from that of the former. I consider an objection to Moore that is based on distinguishing between the everyday and the philosophical contexts. I argue that the objection fails even on the most plausible understanding of the distinction.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00259.x
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