On Jackson’s Descriptivism

Studies in Logic 8 (2):52-69 (2015)

Authors
Kai-Yee Wong
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Through a series of writings, Frank Jackson has developed a new kind of descriptivism that he argues can resist all of the three major objections raised by the theorists of direct reference. In this article I articulate some doubts about Jackson’s replies to two of these objections, i.e., the modal argument and the semantic argument.
Keywords Descriptivism  Direct Reference  Frank Jackson
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