Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):790-812 (2015)

Hong Yu Wong
University Tübingen
What is the significance of bodily awareness for bodily action? The orthodox philosophical account from O'Shaughnessy claims that bodily awareness is necessary for bodily action. Whilst O'Shaughnessy's account appears to be consonant with the phenomenology of ordinary agency, it falls afoul to empirical counterexamples. The failure of O'Shaughnessy's account and its cousins might suggest that bodily action does not depend on bodily awareness. On the contrary, I argue that the contrast between the character of afferented and deafferented agency shows that bodily awareness is crucial to explaining the distinctive character of bodily action in neurologically normal agents. In particular, the capacity to feel one's body ‘from the inside’ appears to be a condition on the capacity to act with one's body in a way that is not like remote control. This dependency of capacities is at once empirically adequate and in tune with the phenomenology of ordinary agency.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqv007
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Attention in Bodily Awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.
Proprioceptive Awareness and Practical Unity.Kathleen A. Howe - 2018 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):65-81.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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