Björnsson and Olinder on Motivational Internalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):379-383 (2014)

Emma Susan Wood
University of Notre Dame Australia
I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine moral judgments. One therefore cannot argue decisively against motivational internalism without arguing against this view about moral judgments.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2013.870221
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The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
Reason and Morality.Alan Gewirth - 1968 - University of Chicago Press.

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