Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179 (2000)

Authors
James Woodward
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
This paper explores how data serve as evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidential relationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves
Keywords Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1086/392817
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What Distinguishes Data From Models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.
What Distinguishes Data From Models?Sabina Leonelli - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):22.
The Appeal to Robustness in Measurement Practice.Alessandra Basso - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65:57-66.

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