Data, phenomena, and reliability

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):179 (2000)

James Woodward
University of Pittsburgh
This paper explores how data serve as evidence for phenomena. In contrast to standard philosophical models which invite us to think of evidential relationships as logical relationships, I argue that evidential relationships in the context of data-to-phenomena reasoning are empirical relationships that depend on holding the right sort of pattern of counterfactual dependence between the data and the conclusions investigators reach on the phenomena themselves
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DOI 10.1086/392817
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The Appeal to Robustness in Measurement Practice.Alessandra Basso - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65:57-66.
The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem’s Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation.Marcel Weber - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):19-49.

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