Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-12 (2014)

Authors
Jack Woods
University of Leeds
Abstract
Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two cases to test the expressivist account as a descriptive or hermeneutic account of moral discourse. I formulate one such test, drawing on a standard explanation of Moore's paradox. I show that if expressivism is correct as a descriptive account of moral discourse, then we should expect versions of Moore's paradox where we explicitly deny that we possess certain affective or conative attitudes. I then argue that the constructions that mirror Moore's paradox are not incoherent. It follows that expressivism is either incorrect as a hermeneutic account of moral discourse or that the expression relation which holds between sincere moral assertion and affective or conative attitudes is not identical to the relation which holds between sincere non-moral assertion and belief. A number of objections are canvassed and rejected.
Keywords Moore's Paradox  Expressivism  Moral Assertion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.Derek Baker - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.
Does Expressivism Have Subjectivist Consequences?Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):278-290.
How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.Alex Gregory - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):241-249.
Expressivism Worth the Name -- A Reply to Teemu Toppinen.Jack Woods - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-7.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Assertion and Belief.Charles Sayward - 1966 - Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.
Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
The Subjectivist Consequences of Expressivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):364-387.
Cynical Assertion: Convention, Pragmatics, and Saying "Uncle".Tim Kenyon - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):241-248.
Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.David Copp - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):1-43.
Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Justification.Robert Hambourger - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-09-11

Total views
1,286 ( #3,215 of 2,433,160 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
95 ( #6,871 of 2,433,160 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes