Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):281-291 (2012)

Jack Woods
University of Leeds
I show that the model-theoretic meaning that can be read off the natural deduction rules for disjunction fails to have certain desirable properties. I use this result to argue against a modest form of inferentialism which uses natural deduction rules to fix model-theoretic truth-conditions for logical connectives.
Keywords compositionality  categoricity  inferentialism  disjunction  intuitionistic logic
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Reprint years 2012
DOI 10.1002/tht3.45
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References found in this work BETA

Multiple-Conclusion Logic.D. J. Shoesmith - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
Rejection.Timothy Smiley - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):1–9.
Multiple Conclusions.Greg Restall - 2005 - In Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. College Publications.
From Worlds to Possibilities.I. L. Humberstone - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (3):313 - 339.
What is a Logical Constant?Christopher Peacocke - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (9):221-240.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Sentence Connectives in Formal Logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
More Reflections on Consequence.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):223-258.

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