If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341 (2013)
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Abstract

I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent of the Doctrine must claim that nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body

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Author's Profile

Fiona Woollard
University of Southampton

References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Abortion and infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.

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