Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341 (2013)

Fiona Woollard
University of Southampton
I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent of the Doctrine must claim that nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12002
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The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Abortion and Infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.

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Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):83-105.
The New Puzzle of Moral Deference.Max Lewis - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):460-476.
I, Me, Mine: Body-Ownership and the Generation Problem.Fiona Woollard - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (98):87-108.

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