Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224 (2019)

Authors
Jack Woods
University of Leeds
Abstract
A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more recent and popular heterodox logics such as naïve logics of truth. I use this discussion to motivate a constraint—logical partisanhood—on the uses of such methodology: roughly: both the proposed alternative and our actual background logic must be able to agree that moving to the alternative logic is no worse than staying put.
Keywords Philosophy of Logic  Abduction  Anti-Exceptionalism  Revising Logic
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1054-2
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
Intertranslatability, Theoretical Equivalence, and Perversion.Jack Woods - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):58-68.
The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.
What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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