Mind 122 (485):171-216 (2013)

Authors
Raphael Woolf
King's College London
Abstract
This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about mental content
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt012
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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Plato's Doxa.Jessica Moss - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):193-217.

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