Realism about laws

Erkenntnis 36 (2):181-218 (1992)
This paper explores the idea that laws express relationships between properties or universals as defended in Michael Tooley's recent book Causation: A Realist Approach. I suggest that the most plausible version of realism will take a different form than that advocated by Tooley. According to this alternative, laws are grounded in facts about the capacities and powers of particular systems, rather than facts about relations between universals. The notion of lawfulness is linked to the notion of invariance, rather than to the metaphysical notion of a necessary connection.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00217473
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Jani Raerinne (2013). Stability and Lawlikeness. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):833-851.
Crawford L. Elder (1999). Ontology and Realism About Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.
Crawford L. Elder (2001). Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.

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