Rationality and the Unit of Action

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining uses of the idea of an extended unit of action in four theoretical contexts. It also explains why the idea of an extended unit of action need not involve magical thinking, and discusses possible replies to an objection based on a worry about recklessness

Similar books and articles

Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Group-based reasons for action.Christopher Woodard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.
The Concept of Unit Coherence and Its Application to Psychology Theories.David Trafimow - 2012 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (2):131-154.
Are My Temporal Parts Agents?Alexander Dietz - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):362-379.
Early Developments in Joint Action.Celia A. Brownell - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.
Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
612 (#30,157)

6 months
89 (#58,589)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Woodard
Nottingham University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

View all 54 references / Add more references