Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277 (2011)
This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining uses of the idea of an extended unit of action in four theoretical contexts. It also explains why the idea of an extended unit of action need not involve magical thinking, and discusses possible replies to an objection based on a worry about recklessness
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy of Mind Developmental Psychology Philosophy of Science Cognitive Psychology Epistemology Neurosciences|
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References found in this work BETA
Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality.Brad Hooker - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Michael Bacharach - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
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