Rationality ideals and mentality

Argumentation 2 (4):419-424 (1988)

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism
Keywords Rationality  behaviourism  mentalism  psychologism  inference  logic  dialogue  dialectic  belief  commitment
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DOI 10.1007/BF00128984
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Vale Press.
Quantum Mysteries for Anyone.N. David Mermin - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (7):397-408.

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Manipulations in Argumentation.Zinaida Z. Ilatov - 1993 - Argumentation 7 (3):359-367.

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