Speaking Your Mind: Large Inarticulateness Constitutional and Circumstantial [Book Review]

Argumentation 16 (1):59-79 (2002)
Abstract
When someone is asked to speak his mind, it is sometimes possible for him to furnish what his utterance appears to have omitted. In such cases we might say that he had a mind to speak. Sometimes, however, the opposite is true. Asked to speak his mind, our speaker finds that he has no mind to speak. When it is possible to speak one's mind and when not is largely determined by the kinds of beings we are and by the kinds of resources we are able to draw upon. In either case, not speaking one's mind is leaving something out whose articulation would or could matter for the purposes for which one was speaking in the first place. Inarticulation is no fleetingly contingent and peripheral phenomenon in human thinking and discourse. It is a substantial and dominant commonplace. In Part One I attempt to say something about what it is about the human agent that makes inarticulateness so rife. In Part Two, I consider various strategies for making the unarticulated explicit, and certain constraints on such processes. I shall suggest, among other things, that standard treatments of enthymematic reconstruction are fundamentally misconceived.
Keywords abduction  agency  cognitive agent  cognitive economy  cognitive resources  convervatism  defaults  defeasibility  empathy  enthymemes  fallacies  generic inference  logic of discovery  natural kinds  truth-preservation  validity
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DOI 10.1023/A:1014929916547
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Enthymematic Parsimony.Fabio Paglieri & John Woods - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):461 - 501.

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