Authors
Jack Woods
University of Leeds
Abstract
Etiquette and other merely formal normative standards like legality, honor, and rules of games are taken less seriously than they should be. While these standards are not intrinsically reason-providing in the way morality is often taken to be, they also play an important role in our practical lives: we collectively treat them as important for assessing the behavior of ourselves and others and as licensing particular forms of sanction for violations. This chapter develops a novel account of the normativity of formal standards where the role they play in our practical lives explains a distinctive kind of reason to obey them. We have this kind of reason to be polite because etiquette is important to us. We also have this kind of reason to be moral because morality is important to us. This parallel suggests that the importance we assign to morality is insufficient to justify it being substantive.
Keywords normativity, normative authority, etiquette, conventional norms, reasons, H. L. A. Hart
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DOI 10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0010
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References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Skepticism About Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - forthcoming - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
Aesthetic Practices and Normativity.Robbie Kubala - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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