The robustness of altruism as an evolutionary strategy

Biology and Philosophy 17 (4):567-590 (2002)
Abstract
Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories :correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories
Keywords Altruism  Group selection  Correlation  Prisoner's dilemma  Evolution
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1020598804674
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Game Theory in Philosophy.Bruin Boudewijn De - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
The Enigma of Rules.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):377-394.

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