Philosophical Studies 152 (2):155-166 (2011)

Richard Woodward
Universität Hamburg
The standard Kripkean semantic theories for quantified modal logic allow the individuals that exist at other worlds to vary from those that exist at the actual world. This causes a problem for those who deny the existence of non-actual individuals. I focus on two prominent strategies for solving this problem, due respectively to Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta (who identify the possible individuals with the actual individuals) and Alvin Plantinga (who identifies the possible individuals with the individual essences). I argue, contra various commentators, that both of these solutions are acceptable by the lights of those who deny the existence of mere possibilia
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Ethics   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9443-1
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Clarendon Press.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16:83-94.

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Citations of this work BETA

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