Authors
Fiona Woollard
University of Southampton
Abstract
The Demandingness Objection is the objection that a moral theory or principle is unacceptable because it asks more than we can reasonably expect. David Sobel, Shelley Kagan and Liam Murphy have each argued that the Demandingness Objection implicitly – and without justification – appeals to moral distinctions between different types of cost. I discuss three sets of cases each of which suggest that we implicitly assume some distinction between costs when applying the Demandingness Objection. We can explain each set of cases, but each set requires appeal to a separate dimension of the Demandingness Objection.
Keywords demandingness objection  consequentialism
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DOI 10.1093/arisoc/aow003
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References found in this work BETA

Practical Ethics.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):264.
Principles of Social Justice.David Miller - 2002 - Political Theory 30 (5):754-759.
Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory.Liam B. Murphy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Principles of Social Justice.David Miller - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):274-276.
The Moral Demands of Affluence.Garrett Cullity - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y. Chappell - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 498-512.
How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost Vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.
On Moral Obligations and Our Chances of Fulfilling Them.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):625-638.
The Value of Sacrifices.Jörg Löschke - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):399-418.

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