What is a mechanism? A counterfactual account
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S366-S377 (2002)
| Abstract |
This paper presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior of one part independently of the others. Each of these features can be captured by the truth of certain counterfactuals
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| DOI | 10.1086/341859 |
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences.James Woodward - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):197-254.
Redundant Causation.Michael McDermott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):523-544.
Citations of this work BETA
What is a Mechanism? Thinking About Mechanisms Across the Sciences.Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135.
Systems Biology and the Integration of Mechanistic Explanation and Mathematical Explanation.Ingo Brigandt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):477-492.
Thinking About Evolutionary Mechanisms: Natural Selection.Robert A. Skipper & Roberta L. Millstein - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):327-347.
Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):313-338.
Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations.Jim Bogen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):397-420.
View all 67 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articlesOn Lemke's Defence of a Causal Basing Requirement.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):162 - 167.
Counterfactuals, Probabilities, and Information: Response to Critics.Aaron Meskin & Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):635 – 642.
Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual.Jim Bogen - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.
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