Res Philosophica 96 (2):245-268 (2019)

Authors
Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
In a narrow sense of ‘disagreement,’ you and I disagree iff we believe inconsistent propositions. But there are numerous cases not covered by this definition that seem to constitute disagreements in a wider sense: disagreements about what to do, disagreements in attitude, disagreements in credence, etc. This wider sense of disagreement plays an important role in metaethics and epistemology. But what is it to disagree in the wider sense? On the view I’ll defend, roughly, you and I disagree in the wide sense iff we hold attitudes that it would be incoherent for a single individual to hold. I’ll argue that this captures the relevant cases, and explore the consequences for metaethical debates between expressivists and contextualists. My view has two broader upshots: that coherence is a theoretically important property, and that an apparently descriptive question—are two subjects disagreeing?—turns on a normative one—are their attitudes jointly incoherent?
Keywords Disagreement  Contextualism  Coherence
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2168-9105
DOI 10.11612/resphil.1771
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Minimal Disagreement.Dan Zeman - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-22.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
How to Disagree About How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2007 - In Ted Warfield & Richard Feldman (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.
Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.
Epistemic Disagreements: A Solution for Contextualists.Giovanni Mion - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (1):15-23.
Contextualism and Disagreement.Anna Kollenberg & Alex Burri - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):137-152.
The Epistemic Significance of Political Disagreement.Bjørn Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-04-02

Total views
49 ( #188,950 of 2,325,508 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #107,671 of 2,325,508 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes