Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304 (1997)
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Abstract |
Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by Yablo. I then consider two common accounts of the mental, token identity theories and dispositional theories, and argue that on neither do mental and physical properties satisfy the requirements for determination
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Keywords | Causation Determination Mental Metaphysics Supervenience Yablo, S |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2004 |
DOI | 10.1023/A:1005301816477 |
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
View all 36 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
The Nonexistence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis.Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):483–504.
The Role of Supervenience and Constitution in Neuroscientific Research.Jens Harbecke - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-19.
View all 17 citations / Add more citations
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