Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):226-235 (2016)

Authors
Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
In this note, I discuss David Enoch's influential deliberative indispensability argument for metanormative realism, and contend that the argument fails. In doing so, I uncover an important disanalogy between explanatory indispensability arguments and deliberative indispensability arguments, one that explains how we could accept the former without accepting the latter.
Keywords inference to the best explanation  explanatory indispensability  moral realism  indispensability arguments  deliberation  metanormative realism
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1002/tht3.220
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Experience and Prediction.Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - University of Chicago Press.
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rorty’s Promise in Metaethics.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (3):292-306.

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An Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism.David Enoch - 2003 - Dissertation, New York University
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