In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
This paper tries to do three things. First, it tries to make it plausible that correct rules of reasoning do not always preserve justification: in other words, if you begin with a justified attitude, and reason correctly from that premise, it can nevertheless happen that you’ll nevertheless arrive at an unjustified attitude. Attempts to show that such cases in fact involve following an incorrect rule of reasoning cannot be vindicated. Second, it also argues that correct rules of reasoning do not even correspond to permissions of “structural rationality”: it is not always structurally permissible to base an attitude on other attitudes from which it follows by correct reasoning. Third, from these observations it tries to build a somewhat positive account of the correctness of rules of reasoning as a more sui generis notion irreducible to either justification or structural rationality. This account vindicates an important unity of theoretical and practical reasoning as well as a qualified version of the thesis that deductive logic supplies correct rules of reasoning.
Keywords Reasoning  Structural Rationality  Normativity of Logic  Transmission  Justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Puzzle About Enkratic Reasoning.Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Instrumental Reasoning.John Broome - 2000 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Rationality, Rules and Structure. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195-207.
Broome on Reasoning.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2).
What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?Julian Fink - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):471-482.
Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Normativity: The Place of Reasoning.Joseph Raz - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):144-164.
Reasoning, Logic and Computation.Stewart Shapiro - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (1):31-51.
Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 45--56.
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
On Practical Reasoning Under Ignorance.Georg Spielthenner - 2013 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):357-373.
Azande Logic Versus Western Logic?Timm Triplett - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):361-366.
The Place of Logic in Reasoning.Daniel Kayser - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):225-239.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-05-22

Total views
172 ( #49,638 of 2,325,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #15,078 of 2,325,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes