Noûs (forthcoming)

Authors
Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
This paper offers a new account of how structural rationality, or coherence, is normative. The central challenge to the normativity of coherence – which I term the problem of “making space” for the normativity of coherence – is this: if considerations of coherence matter normatively, it is not clear how we ought to take account of them in our deliberation. Coherence considerations don’t seem to show up in reasoning about what to believe, intend, desire, hope, fear, and so on; moreover, they seem awkward to take account of alongside more “substantive” considerations about the merits of such attitudes. I aim here to solve this problem, and in so doing to offer the aforementioned new account of how coherence is normative. On the view I defend, which I call the Reasons-to-Structure-Deliberation model, considerations of coherence constitute reasons for structuring deliberation in certain ways: more particularly, to treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as off-limits, and so to focus one’s deliberation on choosing between the coherent combinations.
Keywords Normativity of rationality  Coherence  Structural rationality  Niko Kolodny  Deliberation
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12362
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References found in this work BETA

Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Grounding Practical Normativity: Going Hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.

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Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.

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