Two Kinds of Stakes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324 (2015)

Authors
Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about knowledge-attributions, but only the A-stakes reading preserves the putative link between knowledge and practical reasoning that has motivated it.
Keywords Pragmatic encroachment  Subject-sensitive invariantism  Interest-relative invariantism  Knowledge attributions  Practical reasoning  Stakes  Reliance
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12075
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 42,142
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
VIII—Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 177-189.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-05

Total views
185 ( #38,169 of 2,253,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #45,260 of 2,253,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature