Two Kinds of Stakes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324 (2015)
Abstract
I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about knowledge-attributions, but only the A-stakes reading preserves the putative link between knowledge and practical reasoning that has motivated it.
Keywords Pragmatic encroachment  Subject-sensitive invariantism  Interest-relative invariantism  Knowledge attributions  Practical reasoning  Stakes  Reliance
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12075
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,786
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
Added to PP index
2013-11-05

Total downloads
148 ( #36,808 of 2,231,526 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #98,691 of 2,231,526 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature