A defense of Longino's social epistemology

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):552 (1999)
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Abstract

Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowledge." In this paper, I (a) explain Longino's epistemology, and (b) defend it against charges that have recently been raised by Kitcher, Schmitt, and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) affect on inquiry. She also recommends that we distinguish knowledge from mere opinion by reference to a social standard

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K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University

Citations of this work

State of the field: Transient underdetermination and values in science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
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Science, biases, and the threat of global pessimism.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S467-.

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References found in this work

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Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.

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