Invisible hands and the success of science

Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175 (2000)

K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University
David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing the very goals that Hull believes need to be explained by reference to an invisible hand mechanism. Thus, I reduce the scope of Hull's invisible hand explanation and supplement it by appealing to a hidden hand explanation
Keywords Hull, David  invisible hand  success of science
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DOI 10.1086/392767
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?Sandra Harding - 1991 - Cornell University Press.
Epistemic Dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
Science as Social Knowledge.Sharon L. Crasnow - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):283-285.

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Some Remarks on the Division of Cognitive Labor.Marco Viola - 2015 - RT. A Journal on Research Policy and Evaluation 3.

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