Ratio Juris 2 (3):240-253 (1989)

. The author discusses the conditions necessary to accept the one right answer theory. The argument is based on an analysis of the deep structure of the justified fractional decisions pertaining to the substantive decisional model of the judicial application of law within the statutory law system. The role of evaluative choices is needed to justify the decisions in question at least in hard cases. This makes the theory of one right answer unacceptable in a noncognitivist axiological framework
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1989.tb00041.x
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Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Taking Rights Seriously.Alan R. White - 1977 - Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109):379-380.

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