Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity

Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290 (2004)
Abstract
In this paper, I consider an argument of Harvey Siegel's according to which there can be no hypothetical normativity anywhere unless there is categorical normativity in epistemology. The argument fails because it falsely assumes people must be bound by epistemic norms in order to have justified beliefs
Keywords epistemic norms  hypothetical normativity  instrumental normativity  categorical normativity  epistemology  justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01000.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Laudan's Normative Naturalism.Harvey Siegel - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):295-313.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Epistemic Normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.
Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Added to PP index
2009-08-28

Total downloads
63 ( #85,599 of 2,191,297 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #42,114 of 2,191,297 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature