Pragmatism, Truth, and Inquiry

Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (1):95-113 (2005)
Abstract
C. S. Peirce once defined pragmatism as the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: ‘Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ (Peirce 1982a: 48) More succinctly, Richard Rorty has described the position in this way.
Keywords pragmatism  truth  goal of inquiry  Rorty
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DOI 10.1163/18758185-90000004
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A Puzzle About Desire.Chase Wrenn - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (2):185-209.

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