Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument"

In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 390 (2008)
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Keywords disjunctivism   skepticism   transcendental   McDowell
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.

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