David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 58 (1):155–175 (2004)
The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions are observed, for instance that between recognising that Modus Ponenes is sound and recognising that it is proof against the competent discovery of basic counterexamples, the case for thinking that there is indeed no space for genuine recognition of the validity of Modus Ponens becomes increasingly impressive. It is argued however that, the impossibility of knowledge notwithstanding, we are, in an important sense, entitled to take it that Modus Ponens is sound and that this notion of entitlement can help break the trichotomy ‐ intuition, inference, experience ‐ which imprisons our ordinary thinking about logical knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Wright (2010). On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
Matti Eklund (2009). Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy. Synthese 170 (3):393-414.
Joshua Schechter (2010). The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
Sinan Dogramaci (2010). Knowledge of Validity. Noûs 44 (3):403-432.
Albert Casullo (2013). Four Challenges to the a Priori—a Posteriori Distinction. Synthese 192 (9):1-24.
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