Is pluralism about truth inherently unstable?

Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105 (2012)

Authors
Cory Wright
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract
Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
Keywords truth  pluralism  monism  correspondence  property  scope problem  instability  inflationism  reductive analysis  disjunctivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9691-0
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References found in this work BETA

Categories and Concepts.Edward E. Smith & L. Douglas - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.

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Citations of this work BETA

Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:175-191.
Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.
An Account of Truthmaking.Noël Blas Saenz - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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