Authors
Cory Wright
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract
What features will something have if it counts as an explanation? And will something count as an explanation if it has those features? In the second half of the 20th century, philosophers of science set for themselves the task of answering such questions, just as a priori conceptual analysis was generally falling out of favor. And as it did, most philosophers of science just moved on to more manageable questions about the varieties of explanation and discipline-specific scientific explanation. Often, such shifts are sound strategies for problem-solving. But leaving fallow certain basic conceptual issues can also result in foundational debates.
Keywords ontic conception  epistemic conception  singular causation  explanation
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.038
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References found in this work BETA

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Idealization and the Aims of Science.Angela Potochnik - 2017 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The New Mechanical Philosophy.Stuart Glennan - 2017 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Backing as Truthmaking.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):367–383.

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