On the functionalization of pluralist approaches to truth

Synthese 145 (1):1-28 (2005)
Abstract
Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from inflationary approaches' allegiance to alethic monism, pluralist approaches are able to avoid this explanatory inadequacy and the resulting skepticism, though at the cost of inviting other conceptual difficulties. A novel approach, alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems---namely, with its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and its platitude-based strategy---that need to be dissolved before it can constitute an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth.
Keywords truth  property  alethic functionalism  pluralism  platitude  scope problem  monism  role property  Ramsification
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-5863-9
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers.Richard Rorty - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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Citations of this work BETA
Simplifying Alethic Pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Is Pluralism About Truth Inherently Unstable?Cory Wright - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105.
Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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