Pluralism and the Liar

In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press. pp. 347–373 (2017)
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Abstract

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

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Cory Wright
California State University, Long Beach

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Truth as none and many.Will Gamester - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.

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