Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question

Ratio 20 (4):481–502 (2007)
Crispin Wright
University of Stirling
This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Blind Reasoning.Paul Boghossian - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
Blind Rule-Following and the ‘Antinomy of Pure Reason’.Alexander Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):396-416.
Obeying the Law.Michael Sevel - 2018 - Legal Theory 24 (3):191-215.
Real Rules.Julia Tanney - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):499-507.

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