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Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states
European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374 (2003)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is a viable simulationist account of emotion attribution. However, I also try to say something specific about the form that this account ought to take. I argue that someone who wants to give by a simulationist account of emotion attribution should focus on similarities between emotions and perceptual judgments.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
References found in this work
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.
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